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WESTERN DISCOURSES ON AFRICA 
The first condition 10 understand the problems and contents of African 
philosophy is to refer to Ihe coloni,11 narrative about Africa. there being no 
doubt thai African philosophical rctlections arc all attempts 10 refute the 
degrading views developed in the West to justify shivery and colonialism. 
Central \0 Ihe colonial discourse and the justi fic<ltioll of colonial rule is Ihe 
hierarchical notion of human races wi th its blunt promulg'll ion of the superi-
ority of the while mee over HII other peoples. However. another facet of this 
Western discourse proved nagging in default of being equally innucntial. [t 
came out agllinst the colonial idea of hierarchy through the rejection of the 
notion of human mecs or the affirmation of non-gradablc pluralism. This 
chaptcr studics thcsc two aspectS of thc Western conception of Africa with thc 
vicw of layi ng the theoretical ground for the A friclln responses. 
I. T he Invention of the "White Ma n" 
Let mc begin by underlining that the Western ntlclllpl 10 degrade Africnns has 
requi red the prior embellishmcnt of the ··while man." Grant that Ihe notion of 
pri mitive Afric:! is a construct of Eurocelllric concepts. and the logical 
prccedence of the invcntion of the "white man" over the invention of Africa 
springs to mind, givcn that the invcntors must first believe lies about 
themselves before they give credence to thc demeani ng descriptions of 
Africans. 
A. The Prelogical as Opposed to the Rational 
No need to go into fussy research to lay hands o n the method lLsed to invent 
the "white man." All the ingredients afe found in the thi nker who is univer-
sally believed to have codified the colonial discourse, namely, Lucien LCvy-
Bruhl. One of the leading French ethnologists of his lime, Lcvy-13ruhl is the 
imthol" of i'rilllitiVl! Mel/llIlit)' and Now NtlliI'e.l" Think, two books in which by 
an ilrr:lY of argu ments and alleged facts he endeavors to draw il line of demar-
cation between the West and non-Western peoples. The leitmotif run ning 
lhrough his analyses is Ihat Ihe dominance of logieul thinki ng distinguishes 
Ihe "while man" fro m the rest of hu mank ind. Let us bricny revicw the main 
arguments. 
To herald the radicill nalure of his study, I.-Cvy-Bruh! begins by stilling 
Ihe necd for a new tcrminology. [f we suppose that similar mentill functio ns 
arc found in all human aggregates. the Slime terminology cml be used with the 
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undersumding that "'savages' have minds more like those of children than of 
adults.,,1 But if we assume that otherness instead of immaturity characterizes 
thc non-Western peoples, then the terms and c1:!ssilications derived fro m the 
menl:!i study of Westerners "arc not suitable for those which differ from 
them: on the contrary, they .prove a source of confusion and error."! Confu-
sion dissipates if the notion of "mystic" or "prelogicaf' mental :!ctivity is 
opposed to the logical thinki ng of the West? 
One reason for not assimilating the thinking of non-Western peoples to 
childli ke mentality is their similarity to the "white man" in terms of physio-
logical development. "Undoubtedly they have the same senses liS ours ... lind 
their cerebral structure is like our own," concedes Levy_B ruhl. 4 Bettcr still, 
outside the collecti ve representations, that is, when the primiti ve is taken as an 
individual, he finds that the primitive "will usually feel, argue and act as we 
should expect him to dO.,,3 't'o gel hold of the difference, we must venture, 
beyond the physical constitution or propertics, into the manner of thinking, 
into the strange laws governing the mind of the primitive. 
What is most striking to Levy-Bruhl about the mystic, prelogic:ll 
character is the subsequent inability of the primitive mind to thi nk of the 
physical as physical. This means the prevention of purc cognitive representa-
tions in favor of collective representations in which the cognitive clement "is 
fou nd blended with other clements of an emotional or motor character, 
coloured and imbued by them, and therefore implying:! different attitude with 
regard to the objects represented.,,6 Whereas in the West pure intellectual 
concepls are obtained through the retention of the cognitive element 10 the 
detriment of the affective side, in non-Western societies some such 
purilication is not sought so that a cognitive attitude toward objects is never 
achieved. The mixture of intellectual clements with affective reactions postu-
lates occult forces, which hinder the apprehension of material phenomena in a 
physicnl and causal fashion. Not only are these mystic entities imperceptible 
to the senses, but they also induce the mind to arrange concepts with a total 
disregard fo r the elementary laws of logic. Thus, the same entity can be 
classified both as a person ;lIld an animal. just as the same person can be 
simultaneously in two different places. or be objectively active in reality as 
well as in dreams. 
For Levy-Bruhl, prelogicality and mysticality are "twO aspects of the 
same fundamental quality, rather than two distinct characteristics."? The first 
aspect refers to the contents of the thought, that is, to the permeation of the 
physical with mystic powers incarnating the fear, hope, and religious awe of 
the primitive. The second aspect concerns connections between ideas, which 
because they implic:!te occult forces, operate independently of logic:!l l:!ws. 
The social and technological retardation of native peoples is wholly due to 
this inability to think physically and logically. Some such turn of mind is 
adamantly opposed to scientific thinking and technological orient:ltion; it is 
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only fi t to wallow in magic. thereby perpetuating the subordination of natives 
to mysterious forces. In the words of Levy-Bruhl, "the prelogical mind does 
not objectify nature thus. It filles it rather, by feeling itself participate in it, and 
feeling these participations everywhcre."s 
The statement according to which colonialism portrayed Africans as an 
inferior race to justify the need for II tutor, however disparaging, was some-
what optimistic and condesccnd ing. Through prolonged tutorship, Africans 
could hopefully acqui re, though in a reduced version, the moral and intellec-
tual virtues of the West. In refusing to derive the inferiority of colonized 
peoples from immaturity. Levy-Bruhl. ror his part, ascribes their backward-
ness directly to al terity. Their mind does not work like its Western counter-
part; nor does it follow the same principles. The whole purpose of colonialism 
becomes problematic, since the possibility of closing the gap with the West, 
the so-called civili zing mission of colonialism. is thereby lost. The service 
that inferior races owe to the superior one is all thllt is left. The idea of other 
races being slaves by nature to the superior race could not have been better 
intimated. 
What is quite llstoni shing is the existence of scholars- Africllll or West-
ern opponents of colonial methods- who readily endorse the claims of the 
coloni zer. In the debate ovcr the existence of African philosophy. the term 
ethnophilosophy dcsignates the position of those African scholars who assent, 
directly or indircctly, to Ihc idea of African otherness. Because it provides "a 
revamped version of Levy-Bruhl's 'primitive mentality,'" ellinophi losophy is 
accused of being nothing less than a "secrel accompl ice" of colonial and nco-
colonial designs.9 
Be it the idea of vital force as Ihc supreme ontological principle of Bantu 
thinking, as expounded by Placide Tcmpels. or the predominance of emotion 
in the African thinking process, us upheld by LCopold SCdar Scnghor, the 
truth remains (hat these definitions of African mental attitudes do no more 
than bolster Levy-Bruhl's allegations. What is to say that for the Bantu force 
"is inseparable fro m thc definition of 'being'" if not 10 soak reality in a 
mystical ambicncc?IO In what sense does Senghor's statement that the Euro-
pean has toward the object "an objective intelligence." whereas the African 
Negro "feels it." differ from (he descriptions of Levy-Bruhl?) I In all these 
assertions, emotion lind occult forces do pervade the AfriClLn perception of 
reality to the point of obstructing thc rise of rational thinking. 
The coming chapters will deal with thc real meaning of this apparent 
cndorsement of the colonial discourse. In thc meantime. let us concentrate on 
thc task of exposing the considerable part of self-illusion infiating the belief in 
the exclusive rationality of the "white man. " For prior 10 the attempt of 
refuting what coloniali sm and anthropology said about Africa. we face the 
question of knowing whethcr the self-portrait of Europe is nOI itself an inven~ 
tion. The question sets the proper stage for revealing the strengths and side-
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slips of the cthnophilosophical discoursc. given the correlation between the 
Western definition of the "white man" and the African response, 
S. The Myth of thc "While Man" 
Limiting again my investigations to Levy-Sruh!,s formulations, many 
instances show \hal we are dealing with an illusive idea of the Wes\. To begin 
with. his definitions abound with contradictions denOling now his hesitations, 
now his involvement in pure fantas ies. Already. the mge with wh ich thc idea 
of the distinction of the "white man" is pursued betnlYs so idiosyncratic a 
notion that it repels rationality by abjuring universality. Hardly is it possible 
to pin the label "rational" on an entity that so loudly cries for exclusivcness. 
Further. the theory of primiti~ve peoples frankly hesitates between linenr and 
divergent conccptions of evolution. 
When Levy-Bruhl dismisses the identificillion of the primitive with a 
child. his conception seems to espouse the idea of different types of human 
beings. However. sometimes he reverts to a linear, stage-type of difference. 
Such is the case when. speaking of the perception o f reality. he says: "ours 
lthe Western perception1 has ceased to be so," that is. of bcing impregnated 
with mystic notions. 12 It cannot cense to be mystic unless it was once mystic. 
and this brings bnck the usunl evolutionary gap between the civilized nnd thc 
primitive. Likewise. the provision that without the collective representations. 
the primitive. taken as an individual , is quite ablc 10 behave rationally seems 
to conceive of primitiveness less ;IS a nutural state than liS an accumulated 
product of bad habits ilnd misguided thinking. 
Though Levy-Bruhl exprcsses the need to forge new concepts to porI ray 
the primitive. he comes up with commonplace notions, such as, collective 
represcntations. mystic and prclogical thinking. Is not prelogical a stagc-
notion, implying lateness. immaturity in lieu of ilherity? As 11 mailer of fact. 
l..cvy-Bruhl does not succeed in thinking the otherness of the primitive: his 
compafiltive method cannot but translate difference into superiority and 
inferiority. Beciluse the primitive is constantl y defined negatively. the purposc 
of the exercise is not so much objcctive apprehension as the elevation of the 
"white man" to the rank of the chosen race. 
Where the part of invention becomes overwhelming is in the allempt 10 
reduce, if not eliminate, the innuence of irrational. mystic thinking in the 
West. Consider, for instance. what Levy-Bruhl says about the place of 
dreams. Unlike civilized Europeans. primitives have full faith in dream. For 
them, far from being illusory. dream is even "a provision of the future." and 
so has "far greater significance than to us."!) The tendency to minimil.e the 
part of the irrational to decorate Ihe "white man" with the honors of ration-
ality becomes obvious when we recall how lillie the affirmation is supported 
by facts. Whether we take the Bible. the foundation of European Christianity, 
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or the ordinary belief of the Westerners. the role of dreams as revelation of 
profound truths is largely acceptcd. 
Wh:l t. thcn. should we say when a thinker. such as Sigmund Freud. who 
is the product of Western rationality. pleads for the need to take dreams seri-
ously? Interestingly. Freud notes. "the view of dreams which came nearest to 
thc truth was not the medical but the popular one. half involved though it still 
W:lS in superstition.,,14 So his purpose is not to question the relation of dreams 
to renlity: it is to wipe OUI the part of superstition by raisi ng the interpretation 
of dreams to the levcl of science. While this mny menn that dreams are not 
caused by demoniac and divine powers. still it preserves the important idca of 
drcams bcing revelations of deeper truths that are inaccessible to conscious 
lifc. Through his conviction that dreams are "disguised fu/flimellis of 
repre.\·sed wishes." Freud salvages much of the popular belief of the Wcst. 
which is similar to tlwt of "the pri mitive."ls 
In addition to refuti ng the assertion that the "white man" docs not give 
credit to dreams. the position of Frcud suggests thm the allribution of grcuter 
significance to dreams, llnd not its dismissal. is rat ionally justified. In light of 
rationality turning out to be the accepllLnce of irrationality. L6vy-Bruhl's 
:lltempt to lesscn thc place of dreams in thc "white mun's" thinking appears <IS 
an overstatement of ra tionali ty th<lt is backfi ring. Bluise Pascal wllrns: "he 
who would play the Hngel plays the beast.,,16 
We can call upon thc crilical views of Karl Marx as well HS those of 
Friedrich Nietzsche to strengthen the idca that rationality -begins wit h the 
lIcccptancc of irr:Ltionality. The merit of both philosophers is to havc exposcd 
how much of the history of the West is the story of irrational bcliefs putting 
on the mask of rationality. Take thc history of philosophy itsel f: docs it not 
rel;lIe the man ner occult beliefs are p:lradcd ;lS ralional statements. as exem-
plified by the rationalization of religious bel iefs in all ideali:;t philosophy? To 
brag about being rational on top of being unable to recognize the inilial irra-
tionality of Western thi nking constitutes a double failurc that throws thc 
thinking far uway from ration ality. Genuine nllionality begins with the recog-
nition of irrationality. nOI its denial. This genuincness is thcn understood as a 
conqucst obtaincd by the development of a critical rclationship wi th oneself. 
The main condition 10 achieve such a critical view is the surrender of all self-
natlcring images, a condition thllt Levy-Bruhl hard ly meets. 
Si milarly. thc emphatic affirmation that primitivcs do not obey the 
principle of non-contradiction does not pay 1I11cntion to the controversies 
generated by the same principle in the history of Wcstcrn philosophy. Just as 
lll;lIlY ph ilosophcrs considered the principlc of non-contradiction as a sacro-
sanctlaw of correct thinki ng, so too philosophers who disclosc its limitations. 
somc goi ng so far as 10 suggest the creation of another logic. arc not hard to 
find. A case in point is Hcracl itus. who is famous for dcfcnding the unity and 
struggle of opposites. sllying. for instance, that "the path up and down is one 
• 
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,lt1d the sa me." or "as the same thing there exists in us Ii ving and dead and the 
waking and the sleeping and young and old: for these things having changed 
round arc those, and those having changed round arc t.hese."!? Closer to our 
times, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the Marxists contrast metaphysics 
with dialectics, which they credit with superior intelligence and consider as 
the apex of Western thinking. Unlike metaphysics which, to quote Friedrich 
Engels, declares that "n thing either exists. or it does not exist." or that "it is 
equally impossible for a thing to be itself and at the same time something 
else," dialectics holds: 
motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of place 
can only corne about through 11 body at one and the same moment of 
time being both in one place and in another place, being in one and the 
sHIne place and also not in il. 18 
Granted that those called "primitives" did not have the same understanding 
when they were transgressing the law of non-contradiction, nonetheless under 
pai n of relegating much of Western philosophical breakthroughs to primitive 
thinking, the apparent flexibility of "primitives" about contradictions should 
not be called prclogica1. 
The mere neglect of the various facets of Western thi nki ng is not the 
only issue. The strong impregnation of idealist concepts with mystic notions 
can be established without endorsing the Marxist critique of idealism. For 
example, what else is at work but a mystic thinking when PlnlO speaks of the 
objective existence of a world of ideas? In general. the constant references of 
idealist philosophers to the role of God and the autonomy of the spi ritual 
together with the usc of such notions as the "noumcnal world," "the vital 
impetus." the transcendence of "the idea," show to what extent Western 
philosophy is fraught with mystic notions. to say nothi ng of the truth 
contnined in the accusation that much of Western philosophical energy origi-
nates from the necessity of rescuing Christian mysticism and ideals from the 
attacks of science. 
The reality about the West is not so much rationality versus irrationality 
as the coex istence and interaction of the two. May it not be, then, that in the 
primitive mentality too the two coexist, maybe with the difference that the 
dominion of irralionality is greater over the "primitivc" than the~ "civilizcd." 
At any rate, the denial of irrationality. the stubborn Cllre to reserve rmionality 
for the West and irrationality for the rest of humankind, authorizes us to speak 
of the invention of the "whi te man." What is more. the more obstinate the 
denial. the higher is the irrationality of the classification. 
So great is the blinding power of the alleged Western spccialness that it 
prevents LCvy~BflIhl from asking simple though essential questions. If primi-
tive peoples arc so completely shrouded in mystic notions that they ignore the 
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laws of logic and causality, the crucial question becomes that of knowing how 
they manage to survive in so inhospitable a natural environment. From the 
descriptions of primitives, what we gather is Iheir tolal powerlessness vis-a-
vis nature, given their failure 10 take into consideration its most elementary 
laws. Had this been true, they would have been wiped off the face of the earth 
long ago. Levy-Bruhl cannot recognize this fuct because it objects to the myth 
of the unique rationality of the West. 
This survival is exactly what Henri Bergson undcrlines in his refutation 
of Levy-Bruhl's thesis. Without the confidence in the invariability of natural 
laws, the primitive, according to Bergson, "would not rely on the current of 
the river to carry his canoe, nor on the bending of his bow to shool his arrow, 
on his hatchet to cut into the trunk, on his teeth to bite, on his legs to walk.,,19 
In all the Cllses discussed by Levy-Bruhl. none really stipulates the indiffer-
ence of the primitive to causal laws. Instcad, occu lt causes arc supervenient 
phenomena: they intervene to explain, not the physiclll effect as such, but "ils 
hllman significance . .. its importance to man. and more especially to a par-
ticular man.,,20 Bergson concludes: "there is nothing illogical, consequelllly 
nothing 'prelogicaJ' or even anything which evi nces an 'imperviousness to 
experience. ",21 Better still, he asks us to take note of the "striking ... resem-
blance between the mentality of the civilized and of the primitive man when 
dealing with facts such as those ... loCi deuth, illness, serious accident.'.z2 
Nowhere in the world ha.~ magic ever been a substitute for causllJity. In 
reality, concerning things that are with in their mechanicaL reach, human 
beings rely on mechanical laws to obtain or counter material effects. As these 
effects depend also on wider material connections that are outside their 
control. they tend 10 evoke occult forces whose significance is to humanize 
nature. To be susceptible to human solicitations and intluenced by rituals, 
reality "must appear animated with a purpose"m 
The fu nction of spiritual entities is this provision of reali ty with purpose. 
As scientific knowledge progresses, the mcchliniclil c ircle grows to the 
detriment of the magical one, without however displacing it entirely. In short, 
as an expression of the natural. irrationality remains the forced companion of 
rationality. Levy-Bruhl's allempt to draw a hard and fast line of demarcation 
between the rational and the irrational comes under the heading less of objec-
tive study than of self-deceiving thi nking. Apurt fro m being a falsifica tion of 
reality, the rejection of irrationality particularizes and isolates "the white 
man" fro m the rest of humankind. So exclusive a rational attribute shakes off 
universal ity, and contains its refutation. 
C. Anthropology: Myth and Reality 
Nietzsche's critical study of Western idealism shows how an ideal world is 
constructed and projected onto the real world. The result of this projection is 
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the depreciation of the real world: termed "uppearancc" as opposed to truth. 
the visible world becomes the realm of change and deceit while the ideul 
world is described us eternal and perfecl. Nietzsche finds that moral ideals 
pro vide the ultimme justification for the separation and opposition of the twO 
worlds. Behind the construct ion of the idcnl world as unchanging, immaterial. 
lUld perfect is a moml aspIration of an ascetie type that takes delight in 
declining sensuous life. What knowledge portrays as the opposition of truth to 
falsity, of essence to appearance is, thercfore, the aspiration for a morality 
hooked on an ascetic ideal. The visible being untrue, th e good cannot reside in 
the senses. The purpose of metaphysics, and by cx tens ion of its main product. 
the concept of rcason, is to refute the reality posited by the human body. 
Nietzsche recapitul;Ltes the thinking of the metaphysicians thus: 
The senses, which ;11 oilIer Ihillgs are so immoral, cheat us concerning 
the true world. Moral: we must gel rid of the deeeption of thc senses. of 
Becoming. of history, of falsehood. And above all . away with the 
body, this wretched ideeflxe of the senses. infected with all the f;lUlI s of 
logic that exist , refuted. even impossible. although it be impudent 
enough to pose as if it were real!24 
Levy-Bruhl 's analyses are all impregnated with the same type of evalua-
tion. Primitives arc peoples dominated by passions: lheir body occupies the 
cenlml place in their thinking to the extent of stifling ration;11 thinking. 
Reason has not yet established its power over the body so that emotion domi-
nates even in operations that are supposedly intellectual. According to 
Westem canons of evaluati on, this preponderance of the body denotes a lower 
rank in the hierarchy of being. To call primiti ves prelogical is the same thing 
as sayi ng that they arc sensuous. Their inability to cont rol sensuousness 
explains their failure at dissociating the intellectual from the emotional. The 
superiority of Ihe "white man" is thus supposedly first and foremost moral. 
Instead of being a question of more or less. such moral superiority invol ves 
the quality of thc mind. 
In thus harnessing LCvy-Bruhrs position to the mainstream of idealist 
thinking. we secure the means to solve the riddle of anthropology. When 
African scholarS criticize anthropological discourse, more often than not they 
consider it as a deliberately falsified discourse intent on justifying colonial-
ism. For Pau lin J. Hounlondji. anthropology is a "pscudo_science.,,2s For V. 
Y. Mudimbe. anthropological statements "speak about neither Africa nor 
Africans, but rather justify the process of inventing and conqueri ng a conti-
nent. ,,2(, The notioll or invention brings OUI the confounding dichotomy 
between the claims of anthropology as n science and its unsubstant iated find-
ings. So fixed a dichotomy is bound to raise numerous questions. 
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The dichotomy does not. for instance. explain why European thinking 
could be so lured as to give credibi lity to a fi cti tious discourse. The question 
is legitimate as African scholars borrow much of their critical weapons 
against anthropology from Western scholars. Marx. Freud. Nietzsche. and the 
various schools of structurali sm are knowll to provide the critical apparatus. 
This raises the question of knowing how the same Western culture could at 
once produce the imaginary discourse on Africa and the critical concepts 
exposing its fa llacies. More genera ll y, seeing that the same culture produced 
both anthropology and the sc ientific method with its tested objecti ve results. 
undcr pain of losing a coherent view of the human mind. we must show how 
anthropology fits into the scientific practice. 
To resolve the problem, the first cond ition is to cease contrast ing science 
with myth. lust as meiliphysics inspired rationality and science, so too the 
myth of the "while man" can set off a scientific practice intent on vulidming 
its belief. This suggests that the same process of construction and objectifica-
tion is active in the scienti fic study of nature as well as of human societies and 
cultures. However, while natural objects passively conform, in the Kantian 
sense of the word. to the process of objectificalion, human bei ngs clln protest 
against objectification, thereby nullifying its proced ure and outcomes. 
Through such protest, human beings invent themselves anew so thM transcen-
dence defines them better than the possession of fixed characterist ics . 
Jean-Paul Sartre gave a striking formula for this transcendence when he 
said that in the case of human beings "existence precedes essence:,27 
Unrortunately. more often than not people let themselves l5e defined exter-
nall y; in such cases, they surrender Iheir frecdom and give in to submission. 
For the purpose of objectification is to bring the object under controL which 
when applied to human beings amounts to the negation of subjecti vity. Even 
so. subjecti vity does not go away . Sartre judiciously remarks, "ir I do not 
choose, I am still choosing" by refusing to choose.28 
The ineluctability of choice sets the purpOse of Levy-Bruhl's dichotomy: 
it elevates the white race above the other races and calls for a hierarchical 
combi nation, the very one that justifies the ascendancy of the logical ovcr the 
prelogical. That is why going bcyond mere differcnce, his definition estub-
lishes a contrast between the primitive and the "white man." Such a binary 
opposi tion invites an articulution in which the hegemony of the logicnl race 
supplements the deficiencies of the primitive. AccQrding to most theories. 
economic reasons explain in the last instance the colonial conquest of Africa. 
Far from me to deny the importance of economic drive, slill some theories 
suggest that Europe could huve obtained higher economic relums if it hltd 
avoided the cumbersome and inhuman prHcticc of political and cultural subju-
gmion and opted for the development of the cominent through free economic 
exchanges. The soundness of the <trgument indicates how feasible the idea 
was. But. the theory of colonialism retorts, the rivalry between the major 
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European powers obstructed the option for free economic relations with 
AFric,,: the protection of economic interests favored the possession of colo-
nies. No sooner is this argument accepted than it goes counter to the princi-
ples of liberalism. When. in the name of the free market. some people praise 
Europe for having destroyed all internal ban-iers, strange is the way they say 
simultancously that Europe had encouraged colonization. 
To avoid the contrad1ct.ion, theoreticians of colonialism must concede 
that the "white man" is a myth. an invention. and as such in need of substan-
tiation. The trend toward colonial conquest and anthropological discourse thus 
crops up from the core of the myth. One thing cannot be taken away from the 
myth, 10 wit, its compulsion to look for validation. So that, the justi!ication 
for subjugating non-Western peoples instcad of engaging in free economic 
exchanges emanates from the perceived otherness of these peoples, which 
otherness justifies the hegemonic position of the West. The myth of the 
"white man" calls for the atlfibution of otherness to non-Western peoples, and 
subjugation constitutes its validation following the scientific criterion of 
successful practice as a con!irmalioll of truth. While anthropology establishes 
the otherness of non-Western peoples, conquest confirms materially the 
superiority of the "white man." 
To understand the possibility of this inversion of myth into rationality, 
we must brush aside the idea of a del iberate falsification of reali ty. The 
concept of ideology, of false consciousness, as conceptualized by Marx and 
Engels. is liable to bring clarification inlO the maHcr. Accord ing to Engels: 
ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, 
it is true, but with a fa lse consciousness. The real motive forces impel-
ling him remain unknown to him; otherwise it simply would not be an 
ideological process?9 
Ideology is then an internal deception unnoticed by the author. It is no lie 
because individuals who lie know they are lying. Ideology is not a mere 
fantasy either, since it has connections with reality. The illusion is not about 
the object; it is !irst of all in the consciousness thinking the object. This 
consciousness has illusions about itself, about its motives and nature. As a 
result, what such a consciousness docs materially does not coincide with its 
thinking. The thinking interprets practice differently, more eX<J,ctly, ideally. 
Thus, it vei ls economic pursu its with lofty ideals, and private property 
bccomes a natural right, the slate of the ruling class the defender of the 
gcneral interest, and colonialism a civilizing mission. 
This concealment was apparently the state of mind of Europe when il 
undertook the conquest and study of native peoples. The myth of "the white 
man" invents otherness "s the lower rank of human esscnce while anthropo-
logical studies and colonialism provide the concrete practices of its confirma-
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tion. This false consciousness explains both the sinccrity of the belief in the 
superiority of the white race and the possibility of an objectification of Africa. 
After all , the achievement of objective results in the pursuit of mythical ideas 
is not infrequent. The development of rational thinking in an atmosphere 
heavily loaded with idealism is the very history of Europe. The ideality of the 
fal se consciousness explains the binh of an objectivist and conquering prac-
tice. Thus, through the dualistic conception of mind and bodY--<lIl idca that 
goes back 10 Christian beliefs-Rene Descanes fostered the necessary 
detachment enabling him to grasp matter as a mechanical reality. 
This idealist inspi ration of Western philosophy highlights the main 
purpose of my approach, which is to cxhort Africans to reconcile themselves 
wi th mythical thinking if thcy mcan to play any meaningful role in the world. 
W. E. B. Du Bois wrote: "no people that laughs at itself, and ridicules itself. 
and wishes to God it WilS anythi ng but itself ever wrote its name in history.,,30 
The realization that the so-called European excl usive T<lIion:tl ity is more an 
invention than a distinct chaT;tcteristic should liberate Africans from the need 
to define themselves in terms acceptable to the "white man." 
African critique of anthropology boi ls down to a denial of its descrip-
tions of Africans on account of nonconformity with the critcria set by the 
"white man." As a result, the illusion of the "white man" is reproduced; 
worse, Africa is suppressing all its driving impulses just to conform to an idea 
of humanity whose censorship of irrational dri ves is anything but true. The 
characteristics of the "white man," such as, wholl y Tlll ionai. ascetic, and 
conquering, become models of behavior that Africans must iinilale by surren-
dering their right to freely defi ne themselves. Some such exhortlltion trnn-
spires in Hountondji when, refusing the notion of African alterity, he asks fo r 
the inauguration of philosophical systems which are AfriCllll only by "the 
geographical origin of the authors rather than an alleged specificity of COll-
tenL,,31 Is it surprising if, as a result of this ideological emasculation. Africa 
becomes unable to cope with the modern world? 
Take the critique of elhnophilosophy by those African philosophers 
called "professional philosophers." Whether they refer to Tempcls's attribu-
tion of the notion of vital force to Africans, or John Mbiti's exclusion of the 
fu ture from the African notion of timc. or Senghor's view on the predomi-
nance of emotion in African thinking, none of these thinkers escapes the 
charge of endorsement of colonial discourse. Instead of inciti ng further 
research, the slightest suggestion of African difference arouses indignation. 
Yet such should not have been the reaction of African scholars. given their 
propensity to liken the idea of the "white man" to a false inwge. Whatever the 
idea may otherwise signi fy. for Sllrc it cannot be used to defi ne the hu nHlIl l1eSS 
of Africans. In return, Africans should have suspected that what the "white 
man" despises probably contai ns a grain of truth fo r everybody else. Once the 
idea of the ';white man" is taken seriously as an invention, u wide possibi lity 
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of defining themselves in a creative way opens to Africans. As we shall see, 
despite its numerous shortcomings. negritude was the first attempt to bend the 
anthropological discourse in the direction of self-creation. 
2. Western Attempts to Make Sense of Africa 
LCvy-Bruhl's assimilation of primitive mentality to a prelogieal form of 
thought was bound to generate objections in Western ac'ldemic circles. 
Though few in number, these objections represented remarkable efforts to 
intersperse the triumphant march of Eurocentrism with a pluralist notion of 
human beings. A clear demarcation of these efforts from the evolutionist trend 
of thought helps to bring out the remarkable influence that these Western 
scholars had on African thinkers in their responses to the colonial discourse. 
A. Demystifying Reason 
No sooner had the Western triumplulllt and confident march tow.lrd progress 
recorded its first impressive victories than doubts were heard as to the 
intrinsic val idity of the whole project. The two notions on which the Enlight-
enment had build its philosophy of history. to wit. the idea of reason and the 
progressive march toward freedom, which stood for the unquestionable 
superiority of the Western model of life, were never enti rely successful in 
dismissing doubts and interrogations. A most memorable moment of this 
skepticism is the dissenting position of Jean-Jacques Rousseau on the notion 
of progress. To the question in 1750 by the French Academy of Dijon of 
whether the restoration of the sciences and the arts had served to purify or 
corrupt manners and mor.tls. Rousseau flatly responds in a notorious 
discourse: "our souls have become corrupted in proportion as our Sciences 
and our Arts hHve advanced toward perfection.',32 
Rousseau defends his objection against the belief in progress by a 
comparative study of modern life with the life of those called primitives 
whose noticeable trait is their apparent indifference to the ideal of science and 
the refinement of civili zation. While these peoples, '·protected against this 
contami nation of vuin knowledge, have by their vinues wrought their own 
happiness and the model for all other Nations." modem civilization merely 
muhiplies and expands the vices of greed, luxury. and inequality.Jl Conse-
quently. the modern human being is completel y unhappy. The submcrsion of 
human life in ever-increasing vices simply annuls the benefits of techno-
logical advances. The proliferntion of vices and the engulfment in an anificial 
and frenzied style of life give evidence of estrangement from the right path to 
human fulfillment. 
Rousseau' s defense of the primitive peoples rests on the assumption that 
nature created human beings good so that the closer human societ ies remain 
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to nature the beller their chance is of fulfilling thc end of human life. Hence 
Ihe need of the modern person 10 fall back on the primitivc peoples to under-
stand the real aspirations of human nature. Lei alone being a retarded race, 
primitive peoples represent the prototype of Ihe human essence. the pure form 
before Ihc deformation imparted by Ihe so-c;Llled civilization. Rousseau 
insists: "it was not owing 10 stupidity that they [simple peoples] preferred 
other forms of exercise to those of the mind.").l 
The claim that native peoples arc good because Ihey are ignorant or 
innoccnt, as children are, docs not see their goodness as a positive and 
deliberate choice. The truth is that whi le modern human beings opted for the 
artificial life called civilization. thereby biding farewell to the udvantages of 
natural life, wiser peoples have preferred to stay close to nature. which 
harbors Ihe secrets of human happiness. Their goodness is not due to Iheir 
undeveloped nature, hut to the positive understanding that since "man is 
naturally good:' the best mode of life is the one that follows nature.3S 
Anticipating the dismissal by some contemporary amhropologists of the 
Western discourse as a tissue of inventions whose purpose is to marginalize 
non-Western peoples. Rousseau reiterales his suspicions about the credibi lity 
of the description of primitive peoples given by Western travelers. In one of 
his replies 10 objections. he characterizes these travelers as "more interested in 
Iilling their purses than their heads." and adds Ihat "all of Afri ca and its 
numerous inhabitants. as remarkable in character as they are in color. still 
remain 10 be studied: the whole earth is covered with Nations of which we 
know only the namcs. and yet we pretend to judge mankind!,,;l6 Contrast this 
appeal to Siudy other peoples :md learn from them with the Eurocentric arro-
gance of Hegelianism and evolutionism. By insisting that Ihe alleged superi-
ority of the West only hides moral degradation and a wandering course. Rous-
seau imputes the major omission of human happiness to the whole Weslern 
civil ization. 
With deep roots in Rousseau's thinking. the other tradition of Western 
phi losophy that challenged the haughtiness of the West is the spiritual move-
ment known as romanticism. One facet of this complex movement believes 
that I mmanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason correctly establishes the limits 
of rational knowledge while corroborating the existence of a true reality 
beyond the phenomenal world. The main upshot of this limitation is that 
rational knowledge is only a superficial. external view of the world, exclu-
sively driven by the need to manipulate objects from outside. However, 
though Kant is right in saying Ihal the decper reality of things escapes reason, 
he forgets that human beings have other possibilities as well. for instance, 
sentiments and intuition. The latter seem perfectly equipped to penetrate the 
deeper reality of Ihe noumenal world better than the facul ty of reason. Thus, 
for Arthur Schopenhauer, unlike the superficial view of perception and reason 
in which the world appears as discontinued collections of separate objects, 
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intuition grasps the world as will. and so views objects as integrated and 
coordi nated sources of activity. 
The best illustration of this will is our body. As an object of representa-
tion, Ollr body appears as a thing existing in various spatio-temporal relations 
with other objects. As apprehended from within. we feel it as will. "This will 
constitutes what is most immediate in hi s [the indi vidual1 consciousness. but 
as such it has not wholl y entered into the fo rm of the representation, in which 
object and subject stand over against each other," says Schopenhauer?7 This 
immediateness involves a different faculty than the intellect, and is properly 
called intuition . The revelation of the power of intuition protests in advance 
against the hierarchy established by Levy-Bruhl: ra tional thinking is not the 
highest mental ability; intuition or feeling obtains a deeper view of reality, 
especi all y of spiritual realities. Thi s role of fee li ng endows art with a greater 
cogniti ve dimension than science and speculation. 
The romantic inspiration has continued through various forms in the 
West right up to the twentieth century. A case in point is Bergson' s 
philosophical stand in favor of the irreplaceable role of intuition. which alone 
can go beyond the limitations of rational knowledge. After a series of 
systematic contrasts, Bergson finds that "the imellect is characterized by a 
n{/fllral i"ability to cOlllprehend life." whi le "it is to the very inwardness of 
life that ;IItliitioll leads us."J8 Another important trend is the existenti(Llist 
protest agai nst the dominance of rational thinking. From S0ren Kierkegaard to 
Sartre. the protest insists on the extent to which reason has little (0 say 
concerning the important questions related to the meaning of life. 
To limit the protest to Kierkcgaard, he notes that the ideal of objecti ve 
knowledge excludes. by definition, the subject; nOlle of the terms used to 
describe the world objectively answers the deep concerns of the subject. 
Hence the imperative to become subjecti ve: it counters the tendency of 
objectivism to turn the truth into an object. In this wuy, meaning returns to 
truth, since "for a subjective reflection the truth becomes a m<ll\cr of 
lIppropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more 
and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity.,,19 
The existentialist drift into subjectivism was spurred on by the spectacle 
of the civili zed world being dragged into the insanity of twO successive and 
most destructive world wars. with at its peak the ri se of fascistic theories and 
regimes. [n light of the butchery of these modern wars, the naive belief in 
progress became indefensible; nay. the harrowing question of knowing 
whether Western civilization is really representing an ascending and progres~ 
sive course came into sight. This doubt persuaded many scholars into 
challenging the characterization of non-Western peoples as inferior and 
arrested peoples. 
Both the rise of the romantic inspiration and the mul tiplication of 
prOlests suggest Ihat the issue of rationality versus non-rationality is a debate 
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internal to the West itselr. The diverse outcries agai nst an excessive rationalist 
trend suppressing the role of sentiments and intuition together with the 
aHempt to rehllbilitate the so-call ed primitive peoples attest to the internality 
of the debate. The dispute has to do with the place of reason and. by exten-
sion, of science in the complex issue of c ivilization and human fundamental 
aspirations, That Western trcnds of thought rose against the dominance of 
reason plellds for a nuanced reception of the identification of the West with 
rationality. 
B. The Discovery of Western Idi osy ncrasy 
Predictably. the thinkers who judged the trend of Westcrn civi lization as far 
from being satisfactory were warming to the idea of other civi lizations as 
alternatives. The notion of a Western breakthrough waS not for them a 
convincing idea, for they noted progress in some directions but also regress 
and loss in other equally important aspects of life. So released from the belief 
in the civil izing mission of the Wesl lO which most Westerners were lIt1ached. 
they came 10 conceive of ethnology as a spiritual voyage, an acquaintance 
with the diversity of human nature, and a discovery of new and nlternative 
modes of life. As one author explains, "disslltisfied at home and questing 
abroad: ' the anthropologist "is a scout sent out by a civi lization in turmoil to 
find a resti ng place and learn the IllY of the land.".w 
Implicit in this quest for thc primitive is the belief that wbat in the West 
passes for universal is only an idiosyncratic development. After the :lfrogant 
glorificat ion of Eurocentrism, comes the time of critical evaluation and radi-
calism. No school of thought inc:mlates better this critical project than post-
modernism, given that "the most general characterization of postmodern ism is 
that its emphasis is on call ing inlO question the foundational concepts at the 
heart of Western ph ilosophy.,,41 For many scholars, the origin of post illodern-
ism lies in "the profound innuence of Nietzsche and Heidcgger on contempo-
rary Western inte llectuallife.,,4l This influence grows stronger as many West-
ern intellectual s become increasingly disenchanted with socialism and Marx 's 
ideas of socialist revolulion without. however, recovering any attachment to 
capitalism. Postmoderni sm essentially renects the "sociopolitical pessimism" 
stemming from the clellr impression of a civi li zation caught in a deadlock.4l 
In addit ion to undermining the confidence of the West, the conviction encour-
ages the belief that Euroccntrism offers no other outlets than the frenzy of 
capi tli list pursuits. In light of this disillusionment. the trend of thought so far 
followed has to be altered: abnormality shirts from other cu ltures to that of the 
West and it becomes "increasingly tempting to contrast the West as a whole 
with the rest of the world as a whole.,,-t4 
Such repeated references of Marti n Heidegger to "the end of philoso-
phy" and to the primacy of "questioning." together with his recurring aJlu-
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sions to "the oblivion of Being" lll1d his diagnosis of the West as having 
"exhnusted its possibilities," dcscribe a situation of deep crisis that reuchcs a 
stalematc, Instead of extolli ng Europe's lldvanccd stage-behind which the 
rest of the world is lugging-the diagnosis depicts an abnormal trend, which. 
on top of being singular, forces the rest of the world into a futureless process, 
The Western deadlock entails the rehabilitation of Africa by stripping the 
West of its pretension to be a model. No need for Africuns to enguge in the 
defense of Africa: the West is pleading guilty und the disparugement of Africa 
is only a misrepresentation of its phantasms. 
Heidegger corroborates the idiosyncrasy of the West by a sustained 
analysis of its mode thinking. For him, the essencc of the West lies in its 
particular way of thinking being, which explains its uncommon technological 
leaning. As Richard Rorty elucidates. this particular W<1y flows from 
the separation betwecil the "what" and the "that." This separation 
between what a thing is in itself und the relations which it has to other 
things engenders distinctions between essence and accident. reality and 
appellrance. objective and subjective, rational and irrational. scientific 
and unscientific and the like-all the dualisms which mark off epochs in 
the history of an increasing lust for power. an increased inability to let 
beings be.4$ 
These dualisms inaugurate the age of the world picture. an age in which 
Westerners entirely surrender all other possible relationships with being 
cxcept the one targeting power and conquest. This pathological lust for power 
and domination defincs the essence of Western idiosyncrasy. As such, the lust 
invalidates the promotion of the West to the rank of the most advanced stage. 
just as it rejects thc idea of a unilincar process of universal evolution. That thc 
goal. the miSOI1 d'elre of humanity is the conquest of nature Cll11 never be 
provcn. Other cultures define humanity'S rclationships with nature in different 
terms. and their definition is no less valid than the gOeLl of conquest. The defi -
nition is evcn wiser. given the Western impasse. 
Spccifically, what cxplains the shift in the West of the question of 
ontology from the fact of being to that of a picture or a representation is none 
other than the precedcnce of the preconceived idca or project to the bllre 
reulity of being. In thc words of Heideggcr. world picture 
does not mean u picturc of the world but the world conceived and 
grasped as picture. What is. in its entirely . is now takcn in such a wuy 
that it first is in being and only is in being to the extent it is sel up by 
man. who rcpresents and sets forth.46 
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Even the approach most committed to studying things objcctivcly. 
namely, the sciemific approach, implicates this kind of projection. Contrary to 
the received ide:L describing scientific experiment as the process of learning 
from nature, Hcidcgger shows that the particularity and power of modern 
science dcrive from studying nature through a projccted plan. The whole 
purpose of an experiment is to see the extent to which facts of nature either 
verify or deny the preconceived idea. Th is precedence of the plan in the 
Western dealings with nature demands thc reversal of the historical ordcr. 
Though modern technology is admittcdly a product of modern scicnce on the 
grounds that science chronologically preceded the production and use of 
machines. from the viewpoint of imparting the inspiration. modern tech-
nology is "historically earlier" to science.47 How olherwise could we under-
stand the primuey of the world picture over the fact of being if not as evidence 
of nature being interpreted through a preconceived project. the very one 
handing it over to a Promelhenn inspiration? 
Whut is wrong. we may ask. with this desire for empowerment? 
According to Heidegger. its major druwbuck is that the way being is 
conceived impacts on the manner human beings understlLlld themselves. The 
desire 10 conquer nature enlUils the conception of humULl beings as a subjec-
tivity whose consequence is that everything iLppcars ns a human construct. 
The revel:llion lit the heart of knowledge of a preconceived plan turns lIlJ 
human conceptions into subjective views with no bearing on reality and truth. 
Such is the adversity of the lust for dominalion that "it seems as though 1111111 
1 h· If--48 • everywhere and always encounters on y Lmse . 
To admit that the price for domination is the rcJativization of knowledge 
is to open our thought to the idell thut other ways of relating with the world 
exist as weJl ilS to acknowledge the different choices that sustain thcm. 
Though these other wlLyS may not be as efficient in providing control over 
nuture lLS the Western orientlltion. they muy reveal ways of being and thinking 
that drag human beings oul of their narrow subjectivity. For instance. unlike 
the conqueri ng model , poetry suggests a different mO<le of revealing being: by 
lelling things be, it discovers und glorifies their inner beauty. und so incites 
the mind to tr.mscend the mere desire to control and dominate. This incite-
ment to transcend subjectivism reconverts the humlln essence from "the lord 
of beings" to "the shepherd of Being.,,49 
This Heideggerian analysis draws much of its inspi ration from 
Nietzsche's anatomy of the Western mental orientation. What makes 
Nietzsche'S insights pa rticularly original and illu minating is the demonstra-
tion of the extent to which the lust for dominntion engulfs the human person 
as well. Western ethical and religious ideas are so many wllys of establishing 
within the human person the antinomy of domirmtion and servitude. The 
dualisms of mind and body, plelLsure and duty. naturc and culture. good ,md 
evil. are nothing but the manner onc aspect of the human person, considered 
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superior. noble, and good, is set against another pan, considered inferior, low, 
unct evil. In this uninterrupted connict between the twO components of the 
same person. ethical life is how the superior pan maintains its dominance 
over the lower pun. The opposition of true being (soul, spirit) to fulse Of 
apparent being (thc body). characteristic of the metaphysical form of thinking, 
authorizes this modc of evaluation. Thus metaphysicians say: 
things of the highest value must have a different origi n. an origin of their 
own- in this transitory, seductive, illusory. paltry world, in this turmoil 
of delusion and cupidity, they cannot have their source. But rather in the 
lap of Being, in the intransitory. in the concealed God, in the 'Thi ng-in-
itselr- there must be their source, and nowhere else!- so 
The goal of dominance has brought about the admiration of the warrior, 
but even more so the veneration of the priest. With his resohllion 10 achieve a 
complete victory over sensuous life, the priest represents the highest model of 
mastery, the greatest demonstration of the power of the immaterilll and the 
abstrnct over the mllterial and the sensuous. What is vellentted through the 
priest is the highest value of the West. to wit, the "ascetic ideal.,,51 Because 
asceticism combines metaphysics and morality, it is the consummation of the 
victory over false being and sensuousness. No belief way exists to denounce 
ralsity than to say no to life even as it promises pleasure. The secret of this 
denial is nonc other than the achievement of a greater sense of power through 
the generation of an in ner conflict that unleashes, in the words of Nietzsche, 
"the resentment of an insatiate instinct and ambition, that would be master, 
not over some element in life, but over life itselr.,,52 
C. Post modernist Inferences 
The understanding of Western culture as a particular and aggressive drive 
reiterates the eccentricity of Western mental orientation and mode of life. In 
particular, if. as emphasized by both Nietzsche and Heidegger, what passes 
for reason and universality is a product of an idiosyncratic inspiration, the 
conclusion that knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is an objective 
apprehension of things call no longer be made. This lack of objectivity is not 
caused by a faulty usage of the mind: it is due to the fu ndamental fact that all 
knowledge is 11 construction. that the so-called objective reality is ;l made up, 
subjectIve product. Alluding to the deconstruction theory, Michael Paul Galla-
gher writes: 
all reality is like a text. open to a myriad of connicting interpretations. 
Instead of the "modern" assu mption that objectively correct answers are 
possible, we lire all caught in a "prison house of language," where rela-
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tivism replaces any rationally ordered world. MClming, if it exists at all, 
is created by us and is always in nux.~3 
If a material fact implicates construct ion. then how much more so may it be 
with social and cultural realities. Such a deep-going relativism of concepts 
and views spares nothing; it even chalJenges the entrenched bel ief in personal 
identity. In place of the humanism of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, 
both based on the centrality of human beings and on the permanence of indi-
vidual identity as source of human freedom, "post modernism proposes the 
'death of man ', in the sense of a radical scep ticism about subjective 
approaches and about the imponance given to personality and self-conscious-
ness in Western culture."S4 
Once personal identity as a defining fcature of individuals is challenged, 
the very foundmion of Western religious and ethical ideas as well as political 
systems is seriously shaken. The challenge is grealer to the foundationa l 
beliefs of modernity. Notably, the universal and progressive course of history 
by which the Enlightenment had justified and popularized the view of human 
history as a goal-oriented process implicating distinct stages of realization 
becomes an untenable belief. Branded universal, these stages were believed to 
denote the transition from the simple and inferior state of human freedom and 
knowledge 10 complex and superior moments of rcalization. This gradua l 
scheme led to the supposition that Europe represellls the highest stage of this 
evolution with the consequence that European history reveals the course that 
lagging societies must follow to resume the progressive course of history. 
Stated otherwise, 
Third World cultures arc false ly identified as moving along the same 
historical evolutionary path as the West. propelled by the same cultur<ll 
ideals and the same dynamic forces. Both tile liberal and Marxist 
systems subsume Third World cultural processes under universalist 
theories of evolution that do not apply uni versally . ~~ 
The reduction of concepts to constructs seriously undermines this scenario by 
suggesting that the vision of a universal and uniJinear evolutionary course is 
nothing else than the fraudulent manner Europe so constructs its continuity as 
10 assume the excl usive leadership of the historical process. Otherwise known 
as Eurocentrism, the true essence of this vision is usurpation. which 
usurpation is caused by the phmllasrns of <I cu lture greedy for self-
glorification and conquests. 
The denunciation of Eurocentrism entails the untenabi lity of the con-
cepts used to describe non-Western societies. As noted by D. A. Mnsolo, "the 
historical merit of the post modernist critique arises out of its questioning of 
the validity of taking the Western model of rationaljty as the yardstick for 
==<--
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judging others,"S(, Sueh expressions as primitive. backwurd .• lI1d traditional 
express the fuct of other cultures being forcefully taken in tow by the Western 
path . ,\rbitrarily elevated to the rank of advanced model. Besides decentering 
othcr cultures. the towing has the characteristic effect of misconstruing their 
undcrstanding, In light of relativism urging us to speak of "Western catego-
ries:' "Western eIJisleme:' and "Western principles:' other cultures emerge 
"as 'creations' or representations of Western social science, .. s7 
Because these representations take the West as thc model. a major 
consequence of this usurpation is thut "the traditional approuehes in Western 
philosoEhy sysiemmiclllly exclude and marginalize some stories and experi-
ences," ~ The nct result of erccting a model can only be the 1ll'lrginalizlltioll of 
other cultures, thcir depiction as inferior ,lI1d lagging cultures, Thc promotion 
is a malicious construct in thm it authorizes the characterization of non-
Western peoples as primitl,ve and savage by placing Europe al the center of 
everything, 
From the marginalization of non-Western culturcs, there emerges the 
justification of domestication. the civiliz.ing mission of the West. This domes-
tication promises the progressive removal of the accumulated obstacles to 
progress through the assimilation of Western methods and values, Be it noted 
that the project docs no more than revive the premises of Western episteme 
and ethical principles, Just as Ihe separation of essence and appearance in 
knowledge prepares the dethronement of the 'Ipparent being. so toO Westerni-
zation replaces the false -'man" of native cu ltures with the real --man" as 
revealed in the West. The openllion is how the spiritual principles and rational 
norms of the West endeavor to lake control of ,I life engulfed in scnsuousness. 
magic, and emotion as a result of failing to emancipate itself markedly from 
nature and instinctive behaviors. 
The highly ,Iulo-critical impact of postlllodernism achieves more than 
the disgrace of colonialism Ihrough the denunciation of its phantasms; it also 
moves toward the rehllbilitation of the m'lrginalized cultures, Once the uni-
versality of the Western trend is contested. the way is wide open to under-
standi ng other cultures as legitimate and equally valid alternative forms of 
life. According to Rorty. once more Heidegger shows the way by suggesting 
thai "the opposite of metaphysics is Openness to Being. something most 
e,lsily achieved in a pretechnological peasant community with unchanging 
cusloms,"SQ The paradox is thm PQstmoderniS11l becomes a backward move-
menlthat calls for the reevaluation of traditional societies: Ihe disillusionment 
with the West entai ls a de facto rehabilitation of other cultures. Instead of 
being backward, these cultures represent different modes of life. other ways 
of connecting with Being, In misreading and colonizing these cultures. the 
West was obeying its impUlsive urge to make things conformable to its repre-
sentations. This urge should not come as a surpri sc: the West could not lei 
these cultures be. any more than it lei things be, 
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All these critical views on Wcstern modcrnity convcrge on the major 
discovery of postmodernisll1, to wit, pluralism. By denouncing Westcrn uni-
versalism and the subsequc11l imposition of sameness, "postmooernism has 
rediscovered 'difference' as a key value and relishes in the seeming anarchy 
of cultural diversity.,,60 The radical nature of the post modernist discovery 
ll1Ust be clearly stated. Especiall y, we must disti nguish the discovery from the 
type of pluralism that refrains from characterizing other cultures as false or 
backward while consideri ng them as largely commensurate. Because this 
mitigated pluralism still harbors universalist creeds, it takes differences as 
sUperficial deviations ngainst the background of deeper similarities. 
Radically different is post modernism: it takes other culturcs as valid 
alternatives to the Western course. Thus, Ruth Benedict spoke of cultures as 
being "incommensurable," for "they arc traveling along different roads in 
pursuit of different ends,',61 The rehabilitation of other cultures is thus total. 
without any restriction, fo r no culture has a universal st:l1 US. The commitment 
to radical relativism implies that all cultures arc views taken from different 
perspectives, and not from different spots or moments of the same line of 
evolution. As such. they arc incommensurable. Post modernism denounces all 
forms of reductionism as well as all forms of ranking. The ranking of cultures 
becomes impossible once the unilinear and evolutionary scheme is rebuffed. 
When the basis fo r the defense of Western superiority is rcmoved, a plural-
istic view of history fo rces its way. This pluralistic view of history suys that 
thi rd world countrics werc following their own course untilthcy were brutally 
interrupted by thc West and taken in tow. May it not bc. then, that thc expla-
nation for the grent difficultics that these countries face in copi ng with 
modernity lies in this fu nd,lmcntal disorientation imparted by thc Western 
intrusion? 
The discovery of relativism ,md plur:llislll gives 11 strong backing to 
elhnophi losophy. From the viewpoint of postillodcrnism. it makes sen8C to 
Speak of non-Western philosophies, bettcr still of the philosophies of cultures 
alien to technological drive. The irony is that such philosophies may well be 
more authentic thun the WeStern one, given their c ndeavor to escape subjec-
tivity, to let being be. At any r,lte, besides selli ng aside the temptation to deny 
any phi losophic .. l dimension to traditional culturcs. thc rise of postmodcTlIism 
shows how ethnophilosophy crops up from the heart of Western philosophy. 
frOIll thc tear gencrmed by the encounter with relativism. Other ways of 
knOWing and being inauguratc the plurali ty of philosophy, and so thcir equal 
dignity in a decentered world. This filiation of ethnophilosophy to Western 
philosophy testifies to the seriousness of the Africlll1 cthnophilosophical 
school. The prccipitation to dismiss ethnophi losophy us an endorsement of 
colonial discourse should be resis ted. Thc next chapters study some repre-
selllalivc moments of African ethnophilosophical trcnd. 
